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INTRODUCTION
Public procurement is recognised as a key componentof the economic reforms of the European Union inits attempt to become the most competitive
economy in the world by 2010. The European Union has
adopted a new set of rules which govern the award of
contracts in the public sector as well as in utilities after a
considerable amount of debate and consultation.
The new Directives which will become operational after
January 31, 2006 reflect the wish of the European Union
to integrate its public sector markets and bring substantial
savings to the public sector. At the same time the new
regime has the objective to rationalize an over-capacity
ridden industry, allocate more efficiently human and
capital resources, and increase the productivity and
competitiveness of European firms.
1. A THEMATIC OVERVIEW OF THE NEW
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGIME
Drawing on the wealth of experience from the
application and implementation of previous legal regimes
and the Court’s jurisprudential inferences to public
procurement regulation, the new Directives are set to
achieve the challenging objective to fully integrate public
sector purchasing in the common market and abolish any
remaining non-tariff barriers.
Although the same fundamental principles underpin
procurement liberalization in government and utilities
sectors, the new regime maps a clear-cut dichotomy between
the public sector and the utilities. Their separate regulation
reveals the diametrically opposed nature of the contracting
authorities/entities under these sectors and reflects on the
process of transformation that utilities have been
undergoing over the past decade. Their change in
ownership from public to private has stimulated
commercialism and competitiveness and provided for the
justification of a more relaxed regime and the acceptance
that utilities, in some form or another represent sui generis
contracting authorities which do not need a rigorous and
detailed regulation of their procurement.
The dichotomy in regulation which the new public
procurement regime has established to separate public
sector procurement from utilities procurement exposes an
insight of current market conditions and political priorities
across the European Union, as well as an indication that
the main emphasis should be placed on attempts to open
up the public sector.
The merger of the rules governing supplies, works and
services procurement into a single legal instrument
represents a successful attempt on the part of the European
Union to codify supranational administrative provisions
which aim to harmonize domestic legal regimes, public or
private, which co-ordinate the award of public contacts.
The codification, apart from the obvious benefits of legal
certainty and legitimate expectation, has two important
implications: legal efficiency and compliance discipline. As
far as legal efficiency is concerned, the new codified
Directive will speed up and streamline its implementation
process by Member States, especially the new arrivals from
the 2004 Accession Treaty, and provide for a one-stop shop
reference point in national legal orders, augmented by the
Court’s vesting of direct effectiveness upon the Directive’s
predecessors in numerous occasions.
On the other hand, codification will enhance
compliance, as it will remove any remaining uncertainties
over the applicability of the previously fragmented regime
and afford contracting authorities a disciplined method in
dispersing their procurement functions. The main
influence of the codified public sector procurement
Directive can be traced in important recent case law4
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developments from the European Court of Justice (for a
comprehensive analysis of the public procurement case law,
see Bovis, “Recent case law relating to public procurement:
A beacon for the integration of public markets”, 39
CMLRev, 2002). In particular, case law on the definition of
contracting authorities, the use of award procedures and
award criteria, and the possibility for contracting
authorities to use environmental and social considerations
as criteria for the award of public contracts (see for
example Communication from the European Commission
to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic
and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions,
“Working together to maintain momentum” 2001 Review of
the Internal Market Strategy, Brussels, 11 April 2001,
COM(2001)198 final).
As far as the utilities procurement is concerned, the two
main reasons for the introduction of a distinctive legal
regime which aims at coordinating procedures for the
award of contracts in the utilities sectors evolve around the
relations of the state with such entities. Firstly, there is the
numerous ways in which national authorities can influence
the purchasing behaviour of these entities, such as
participation in their capital and representation in their
administrative, managerial or supervisory bodies; and
secondly, the closed nature of the markets in which utilities
operate, as a result of special or exclusive rights granted by
the Member States, necessitates the operation of a
procurement regulatory regime which ensures on the one
hand compliance with the fundamental principles of the
EU Treaties and on the other hand compatibility with anti-
trust and sector specific regulation in the utilities sectors.
2. THE NEW CONCEPTS IN PUBLIC SECTOR
PROCUREMENT
The codified public sector Directive has introduced a
series of new concepts which are the product of
jurisprudential inferences and policy refining of the
previous legal regimes. They intend to modernize public
purchasing and align the procurement of government and
its agencies with that of utilities which operate in a more
commercially oriented environment.
2.1. Eligibility of bodies governed by public law to
tender
The new public sector Directive clearly accepts that
entities which are covered by its rules can participate in the
award of public contracts alongside private sector
undertakings. Member States should ensure that the
participation of a body governed by public law as a
tenderer in a procedure for the award of a public contract
does not cause any distortion of competition in relation to
private tenderers. The eligibility of bodies governed by
public law to participate in tendering procedures has been
influenced by case law (see case C-94/99, ARGE
Gewässerschutzt v Bundesministerium für Land-und
Forstwirtschaft, para 30, judgment of 7 December 2000,
where the Court stated that ruled that directly or indirectly
subsidized tenders by the state or other contracting
authorities or even by the contracting authority itself can
be legitimately part of the evaluation process). There is a
protection mechanism built in Article 55(e) of the public
sector Directive, which specifies that in case of abnormally
law tenders, the contracting authority may reject those
tenders, if it establishes that the tenderer is the recipient of
state aid which may have been granted illegally. The onus to
prove the legitimacy of the state aid rests with the tenderer.
2.2. Joint and Centralized procurement
The public sector Directive aims at introducing a regime
where procurement can benefit from scale economies and
streamlining planning, operation and delivery. In the light
of the diversity of public procurement contracts in
Member States, contracting authorities have been given the
freedom to make provision for contracts for the design and
execution of work to be awarded jointly. The decision to
award contracts jointly must be determined by qualitative
and economic criteria, which may be defined by national
law. According to Article 1(10) of the public sector
Directive, a central purchasing body is a contracting
authority which: (i) acquires supplies and/or services
intended for contracting authorities, or (ii) awards public
contracts or concludes framework agreements for works,
supplies or services intended for contracting authorities.
2.3. Official list of contractors
The public sector Directive provides for a central system
of certification of private and public organizations for the
purposes of providing evidence of financial and economic
standing, as well as levels of technical capacity in public
procurement selection and qualification procedures. Such
systems must be mutually recognized by all Member States,
and registration of entities in official lists of contractors,
suppliers or service providers is influenced by the Court’s
case law, where an economic operator belonging to a group
claims the economic, financial or technical capabilities of
other companies in the same group in support of its
application for registration (see case C-76/81, SA
Transporoute et Travaux v Minister of Public Works, [1982] ECR
457; case C-27/86, Constructions et Enterprises Indusrtielles SA
(CEI) v Association Intercommunale pour les Autoroutes des
Ardennes; case C-28/86, Ing Bellini & Co. SpA v Regie de
Betiments; case C-29/86, Ing Bellini & Co SpAv Belgian State,
[1987] ECR 3347; case C-89/92, Ballast Nedam Groep NV v
Belgische Staat, [1994] 2 CMLR; case C-5/97, Ballast Nedam
Groep NV v Belgische Staat, judgment of December 18, 1997;
case C-176/98, Holst Italia v Comune di Cagliari, judgment of
December 2, 1999).
Member States may determine the level of requirements
to be met for such registrations and the period of their
validity, in particular requirements for joint and several
liability where an operator relies on the financial standing
of another company in the same group. 5
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2.4. The competitive dialogue
The competitive dialogue is the most publicized change
brought about by the new public procurement regime. Its
inception is attributed to three reasons: (i) the inability of
open or restricted procedures to facilitate the award of
complex public contracts, including concessions and
public-private partnerships, (ii) the exceptional nature of
negotiated procedures without prior advertisement and
(iii) the restrictive interpretation of the grounds for using
negotiated procedures with prior advertisement.
Article 29 of the public sector Directive establishes the
competitive dialogue as an award procedure, alongside
open, restricted and negotiated procedures. The
competitive dialogue must be used exceptionally in cases of
particularly complex contracts, where the use of the open
or restricted procedures will not allow the award of the
contract, and the use of negotiated procedures cannot be
justified. A public contract is considered to be particularly
complex where the contracting authorities are not able to
define in an objective manner the technical specifications
which are required to pursue the project, or they are not
able to specify the legal or financial make-up of a project.
2.5. Framework procurement
The new public sector Directive has for the first time
introduced framework procurement to the public sector
contracting authorities. According to Article 1(5) of the
public sector Directive, a framework agreement is an
agreement between one or more contracting authorities
and one or more economic operators, the purpose of
which is to establish the terms and conditions of public
contracts to be awarded during a given period, in particular
with regard to price and, where appropriate, the quantity
of supplies, works or services envisaged.
2.6. Electronic procurement
The rapid expansion of electronic purchasing systems in
private sector procurement and the continuous
development of electronic purchasing techniques have
made an impact with the public sector Directive.
Electronic procurement can contribute in increasing
competition and streamlining public purchasing,
particularly in cases where repetitive purchasing allows
efficiencies to be achieved both in time and in financial
terms.
2.6.1. Dynamic purchasing systems
Article 1(6) of the public sector Directive provides for
the establishment of dynamic purchasing systems. A
dynamic purchasing system is an electronic process which
allows contracting authorities to utilize techniques available
to the private sector in order to procure supplies or
services of repetitive nature. Any economic operator which
submits an indicative tender in accordance with the
specification and meets the selection criteria should be
allowed to join such a system. This purchasing technique
allows contracting authorities, through the establishment
of a pre-selected list of tenderers, to have a particularly
broad range of tenders as a result of the electronic facilities
available, and to ensure, in principle, optimum use of
public funds through broad competition.
2.6.2. Electronic auctions
According to Article 1.7 of the public sector Directive an
electronic auction is a repetitive process involving an
electronic device for the presentation of new prices which
are revised downwards, or new values concerning certain
elements of tenders. The presentation of such financial
information occurs after an initial full evaluation of the
tenders, enabling them to be ranked using automatic
evaluation methods.
2.7. The award criteria and the introduction of
policies in public procurement
2.7.1 Contractual performance and public
procurement
The new public sector Directives and the new utilities
Directives remain silent over the possibility of expressly
authorizing social or environmental consideration as part
of the award criteria of public contracts. Although the draft
Directives, at the insistence of the European Parliament,
contained specific provisions relevant to workforce matters
as part of the award criteria, such provisions were omitted
from the final text. The Commission has adopted a myopic
view that considerations related to contractual
performance cannot be used as criterion for the award of
the contract. The Court had the opportunity to correct the
Commission’s interpretation and point to the right
direction of its judgments, where a condition relating to
the employment of long-term unemployed persons or the
protection of the environment can legitimately constitute a
criterion for the award of the contract (see case 31/87,
Gebroeders Beentjes v The Netherlands [1989] ECR 4365 at
para 14; case C-225/98, Commission v French Republic,
(Nord-Pas-de-Calais) [2000] ECR 7445), at para 52; case
C-513/99, Concordia Bus Filandia v Helsingin Kaupunki et
HKL-Bussiliikenne, [2002] ECR 7213, at para 31).
However, the new public procurement regime has failed to
adopt previous jurisprudential inferences and clarify the
position of contacting authorities over the legitimacy of
pursuing socio-economic and environmental policies
through public procurement (for a detailed analysis of the
ordo-liberal versus the neo-classical approach in public
procurement regulation, see Bovis, “Public Procurement
and the Internal Market of the 21st Century: Economic
Exercise versus Policy Choice”, Chapter 17 in EU Law for
the 21st Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, op cit).
Examples of conditions relevant to contractual
performance in public contracts may include requirements
to recruit long-term job-seekers or to implement training
measures for the unemployed or young persons, to comply6
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in substance with the provisions of the International
Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions, assuming that
such provisions have not been implemented in national law,
and to recruit more handicapped persons than are
required under national legislation.
2.7.2. Social considerations
In Beentjes (case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes op cit), the
Court ruled that social policy considerations and in
particular measures aiming at the combating of long term
unemployment could only be part of the award criteria of
public contracts, especially in cases where the most
economically advantageous offer is selected. The Court
accepted that the latter award criterion contains features
that are not exhaustively defined in the Directives,
therefore there is discretion conferred on contracting
authorities to specify what would the most economically
advantageous offer for them. However, contracting
authorities cannot refer to such measures as a selection
criterion and disqualify candidates, which could not meet
the relevant requirements. The selection of tenderers is a
process, which is based on an exhaustive list of technical
and financial requirements expressly stipulated in the
relevant Directives and the insertion of contract
compliance as a selection and qualification requirement
would be considered ultra vires.
The Court held that a contractual condition relating to
the employment of long term unemployed persons is
compatible with the public procurement Directives, if it
has no direct or indirect discriminatory effect on tenders
from other Member States. Furthermore, such a
contractual condition must be mentioned in the tender
notice (Bellini, case 28/86, [1987] ECR 3347). Rejection
of a tenderer on the grounds of its inability to employ long-
term unemployed persons has no relation to its suitability
to perform the contract based on its economic and
financial standing and its technical knowledge and ability.
The Court maintained that measures relating to
employment could be utilised as a feature of the award
criteria, only when they are part of a contractual obligation
of the public contract in question and on condition that
they do not run contrary to the fundamental principles of
the Treaty. The significance of that qualification has
revealed the Court’s potential stance over the issue of
contract compliance in public procurement.
In Nord-pas-de-Calais (case C-225/98, Commission v French
Republic, [2000] ECR 7445), the Court also considered
whether a condition linked to a local project to combat
unemployment could be considered as an award criterion
of the relevant contract. The Court held that the most
economically advantageous offer does not preclude the
possibility for contracting authorities to use as a criterion a
condition linked to the campaign against unemployment,
provided that condition is consistent with all the
fundamental principles of Community law, in particular the
principles of non-discrimination, the right of
establishment and the freedom to provide services (see
Beentjes, para 29). Furthermore, even if such a condition
does not contravene substantive acquis communautaire
provisions, it must comply with all the procedural rules
laid down in the public procurement framework and in
particular the rules on advertising (See, to that effect,
paragraph 31 of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where the Court
stipulated that an award criterion linked to the campaign
against unemployment must be expressly mentioned in the
contract notice so that contractors may become aware of
its existence). The Court therefore accepted the
employment considerations as an award criterion which is
part of the most economically advantageous offer, provided
it is consistent with the fundamental principles of
Community law, in particular the principle of non-
discrimination and it is advertised in the contract notice.
2.7.3. Environmental considerations
In Concordia (case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Filandia v
Helsingin Kaupunki et HKL-Bussiliikenne, [2002] ECR 7213),
the Court was asked inter alia whether environmental
considerations such as low emissions and noise levels of
vehicles could be included amongst the factors of the most
economically advantageous criterion, in order to promote
certain types of vehicles that meet or exceed certain
emission and noise levels. Advocate-General Mischo in his
opinion delivered on December 13, 2001 followed the
Beentjes principle and established that contracting
authorities are free to determine the factors under which
the most economically advantageous offer is to be assessed.
Therefore, environmental considerations could be part of
the award criteria, provided that they do not discriminate
over alternative offers, as well as that they have been clearly
publicized in the tender or contract documents.
However, the inclusion of such factors in the award
criteria should not prevent alternative offers that satisfy the
contract specifications being taken into consideration by
contracting authorities. Clearly the Advocate General
wanted to exclude any possibility of environmental
considerations being part of selection criteria or disguised
as technical specifications, capable of discriminating
against tenderees that could not meet them. The Court
held that criteria relating to the environment, in order to
be permissible as additional criteria under the most
economically advantageous offer, must satisfy a number of
conditions; namely they must be objective, universally
applicable, strictly relevant to the contract in question, and
clearly contribute an economic advantage to the
contracting authority (see the analysis of the Advocate
General Mischo in his opinion of Concordia, paras 77 -123).
Under Article 6 of the EU Treaty, environmental
protection requirements are to be integrated into the
definition and implementation of the Community policies
and activities referred to in Article 3 of the EU Treaty, in
particular with a view to promoting sustainable
development. The public sector Directive clarifies how 7
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contracting authorities may contribute to the protection of
the environment and the promotion of sustainable
development, whilst ensuring the fairness and competition
in the award of public contracts. Article 50 of the public
sector Directive deals with Environmental management
standards. It provides that contracting authorities may
require the production of certificates drawn up by
independent bodies attesting the compliance of the
economic operator with certain environmental
management standards, they must refer to the Community
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) or to
environmental management standards based on the
relevant European or international standards certified by
bodies conforming to Community law or the relevant
European or international standards concerning
certification. Contracting authorities must recognize
equivalent certificates from bodies established in other
Member States. They must also accept other evidence of
equivalent environmental management measures from
economic operators.
2.8. Procurement and probity
The award of public contracts to economic operators
who have participated in a criminal organization or who
have been found guilty of corruption or of fraud to the
detriment of the financial interests of the European
Communities, or of money laundering, should be avoided.
Where appropriate, the contracting authorities should ask
candidates or tenderers to supply relevant documents and,
where they have doubts concerning the personal situation
of a candidate or tenderer, they may seek the cooperation
of the competent authorities of the Member State
concerned. The exclusion of such economic operators
should take place as soon as the contracting authority has
knowledge of a judgment concerning such offences
rendered in accordance with national law that has the force
of res judicata. If national law contains provisions to this
effect, non-compliance with environmental legislation or
legislation on unlawful agreements in public contracts
which has been the subject of a final judgment or a decision
having equivalent effect may be considered an offence
concerning the professional conduct of the economic
operator concerned or grave misconduct. Non-observance
of national provisions implementing Council Directives
2000/78 and 76/207 concerning equal treatment of
workers, which has been the subject of a final judgment or
a decision having equivalent effect may be considered an
offence concerning the professional conduct of the
economic operator concerned or grave misconduct.
Article 45 of the public sector Directive deals with the
personal situation of the candidate or tenderer. It provides
that any candidate or tenderer who has been the subject of
a conviction by final judgment of which the contracting
authority is aware for one or more of the reasons listed
below must be excluded from participation in a public
contract:
(a) participation in a criminal organization, as defined in
Article 2(1) of Council Joint Action 98/733/JHA (See OJ L
351, 29.12.1998, p 1), (b) corruption, as defined in
Article 3 of the Council Act of 26 May 1997 (See OJ C
195, 25.6.1997, p.1) and Article 3(1) of Council Joint
Action 98/742/JHA (See OJ L 358, 31.12.1998, p 2)
respectively; (c) fraud within the meaning of Article 1 of
the Convention relating to the protection of the financial
interests of the European Communities (See OJ C 316,
27.11.1995, p 48); (d) money laundering, as defined in
Article 1 of Council Directive 91/308 on prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose of money
laundering (see OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p 77, Directive as
amended by Directive 2001/97/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of December 4, 2001 (OJ L
344, 28.12.2001, p 76)).
3. THE NEW CONCEPTS IN UTILITIES
PROCUREMENT
3.1. Remit and extent of coverage
As a result of the liberalization process in public utilities
across the European Union and the introduction of sector-
specific regulation covering the operational interface of
such entities, the regulation of their purchasing practices
no longer requires the rigidity and disciplined structure of
that of public sector authorities. Utilities procurement has
undergone a dramatic restructuring with effects varying
from the relaxation of the competitive tendering regime to
the total disengagement of the public procurement rules in
industries that operate under competitive conditions,
especially in the telecommunications and water sectors.
The new utilities procurement Directive does not regard
telecommunication utilities as contracting entities, since
the sector has been subjected to competitive forces
adequate enough to ensure its commercial character
operation. Conversely, the postal sector which was
previously excluded from procurement regulation is now
covered, but not until January 1, 2009 in order to allow
sufficient time for transitional measures aiming at the
liberalisation of postal services sector of Member States.
For a definition of postal activities in Member States, it is
necessary to take into account the definitions of Directive
97/67/EC on common rules for the development of the
internal market of Community postal services and the
improvement of quality of service (See OJ L 15,
21.1.1998, as last amended by Regulation 1882/2003, OJ
L 284, 31.10.2003).
The new concepts of new utilities Directive 2004/17
embrace the links of the state with utilities through special
or exclusive rights and the notion of affiliated undertakings
as a potential subject of utilities procurement coverage.
Finally, the new regime introduces grounds for exemption
for entities operating in competitive markets.8
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3.2. Special or exclusive rights in the utilities
For the purposes of the new utilities Directive and in
accordance with Article 2(3), “special or exclusive rights”
mean rights granted by a competent authority of a Member
State by way of any legislative, regulatory or administrative
provision the effect of which is to limit the exercise of
activities defined in Articles 3–7 to one or more entities,
and which substantially affects the ability of other entities
to carry out such activity. The activities covering special or
exclusive rights embrace the following utilities sectors: Gas,
heat and electricity, water, postal services, transport
services, exploration for, or extraction of, oil, gas, coal or
other solid fuels, as well as ports and airports
The new utilities Directive provides for a more
restrictive definition of the notion of special or exclusive
rights than its predecessor. The consequence of the
definition is depicted in three ways: firstly, the availability
of a procedure for the expropriation or use of property and
the ability of an entity to place network equipment on,
under or over a public highway for the purpose of
constructing networks or port or airport facilities, do not
automatically constitute exclusive or special rights within
the meaning of the Directive; secondly a special or
exclusive right does not exist merely due to the fact that an
entity supplies drinking water, electricity, gas or heat to a
network which is itself operated by an entity enjoying
special or exclusive rights granted by a competent authority
of a Member State; and thirdly, rights granted by Member
State through acts of concession, to a limited number of
undertakings on the basis of objective, proportionate and
non-discriminatory criteria that allow any interested party
fulfilling those criteria to enjoy those rights are not
considered special or exclusive rights.
The practical implication of the definition of special or
exclusive rights under the new utilities Directive is the
non-applicability of the regime to the entities that do not
meet the conditions but are still covered under the existing
regime. The influence of the Court’s jurisprudence in the
restrictive application of special or exclusive rights is
evident. The Court’s approach in the British
Telecommunications case does not allow the application of the
sector-specific definition of leased (licensed) lines in the
telecommunications sector to the respective utilities
procurement definition of special or exclusive right. In that
case the Court ruled that special or exclusive rights under
the Leased Lines Directive (EC Directive 92/44, OJ 1992,
L 165/27) did not exist as a result of the licenses conferred
by Member States to entities.
The situation could be more complicated as entities
compete for such special or exclusive rights such as
concessions or public-private partnerships on the basis of
objective, proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria
which can restrict market access to other undertakings and
by definition limit the number of interested parties. The
analogous application of the British Telecommunications
judgment is dubious, as the Court remained silent over
such scenario. The Commission however has indicated that
where Member States do not enjoy discretion in the
conferral of special or exclusive rights, by definition they
cannot detrimentally influence the procurement behaviour
of the recipient of such rights and as a consequence the
utilities procurement regime need not to apply (See
European Commission, “Explanatory memorandum of the
proposal for the Directive co-coordinating the
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water,
energy and transport sectors”, COM (2000) 276 fin).
3.3. Affiliated undertakings
Interestingly, the new utilities regime also excludes from
its remit contracts awarded to affiliated undertakings.
Article 23 of the new utilities Directive excludes contracts
awarded by a contracting entity to an affiliated
undertaking, or by a joint venture, formed exclusively by a
number of contracting entities for the purpose of carrying
out activities which are covered by the utilities Directive to
an undertaking which is affiliated with one of these
contracting entities.
Under the new utilities procurement regime, the term
affiliated undertaking means any undertaking the annual
accounts of which are consolidated with those of the
contracting entity in accordance with the requirements of
the Seventh Council Directive 83/349 on consolidated
accounts (See OJ L 193, 18.7.1983, p 1, as last amended
by Directive 2001/65/EC (OJ L 283, 27.10.2001, p 28).
In cases of entities which are not subject to that Directive,
affiliated undertaking means any undertaking over which
the contracting entity may exercise, directly or indirectly, a
dominant influence within the meaning of Article 2(1)(b),
or any undertaking over which the contracting entity may
exercise a dominant influence by virtue of ownership,
financial participation, or the rules which govern it.
3.4. Competitive markets in utilities
Privatized utilities could be, in principle, excluded from
the procurement rules when a genuinely competitive
regime within the relevant market structure would rule out
purchasing patterns based on non-economic
considerations. The new utilities Directive should not
apply to markets where the participants pursue an activity
which is directly exposed to competition on markets to
which access is not limited within the relevant Member
State. The new utilities Directive has therefore introduced
a procedure, applicable to all sectors covered by its
provisions that will enable the effects of current or future
liberalization and competitiveness to be taken into account.
Article 30 of the new utilities Directive provides for the
procedure for establishing whether a given activity of a
utility entity is directly exposed to competition. The
question of whether an activity is directly exposed to
competition shall be decided on the basis of criteria that 9
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are in conformity with the Treaty provisions on
competition, such as the characteristics of the goods or
services concerned, the existence of alternative goods or
services, the prices and the actual or potential presence of
more than one supplier of the goods or services in
question. Where access to a given market does not result
from the implementation of appropriate Community
legislation, it should be demonstrated that such access is
uninhibited de jure and de facto.
When a Member State considers that access to the
relevant market activity is uninhibited, it must notify the
Commission and provide all relevant facts, and in
particular of any law, regulation, administrative provision
or agreements, where appropriate together with the
position adopted by an independent national authority that
is competent in relation to the regulation of the activity
concerned. The Commission can issue a Decision which
verifies that the relevant activity is provided in a
competitive environment. Such verification is also
presumed if the Commission has not adopted a Decision
concerning the inapplicability of the utilities Directive
within a certain period.
The disengagement of the utilities procurement regime
as a result of the operation of the relevant entities in
competitive markets by virtue of Article 30 of the new
utilities Directive does not apply to the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement. This represents a legal lacuna as
the procedural flexibility envisaged in the European
procurement regulatory regime does not cover entities
covered under the GPA. Rectification of the problem
would require amendment to the GPA with the conferral
of concessions and reciprocal access rights to the GPA
signatories.
4. PROCUREMENT AND WTO
The European public procurement regime has
influenced to a large extent the WTO in its attempts to
liberalize the public sector of its members/signatories. The
principles of the European regime have been transplanted
to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and
they epitomize a global benchmark for the award of public
contracts.
The regulation of public procurement reflects on two
opposite dynamics: one of a community-wide orientation
and one of national priorities. These dynamics give public
procurement a dimension of an economic exercise and a
dimension of an exercise in policy choice respectively.
Future litigation will be extremely important in
understanding the thrust of the new regime. The role of
the European Court of Justice has been instrumental in
shaping many of the newly introduced concepts and in the
future will be invaluable in interpreting the new public
procurement Directives.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The new regime introduces a set of innovations that will
make the rules more flexible, more implementable at
national level and finally more enforceable. The new Public
Procurement Directives evolve around three themes:
simplification, modernization and flexibility.
Simplification
Under simplification, we have been promised two sets of
rules (instead of four previously): one for the public sector
(supplies, services and works) and one for the utilities
(entities in the water, telecoms, transport, energy and post
sectors). The objective of simplification has been met to a
large extent. The new public sector Directive represents a
notable example of legal codification which will result in
increased efficiency and legal certainty.
Modernisation
Under modernization, we have been promised the
introduction of a new award procedure called “competitive
dialogue”, which will enable the public sector to award
complex projects such as public private partnerships and
trans-European networks more effectively. Also, we will see
the use of “framework procurement”, where arrangements
with a number of contractors, suppliers and service
providers will last for a number of years and the public
sector will have the discretion to pick a given partner from
the framework list. This will bring the public sector closer
to a seamless supply chain management. Finally, the new
regime will introduce fully-fledged e-procurement and the
use of information technology, in an attempt to process the
logistics of public sector purchasing faster and more
efficiently.
The objective of modernization is partly met, mainly as
a result of the enormity of the newly introduced concepts.
The ability of bodies governed by public law to tender for
public contracts along private undertakings is a significant
development. The use of framework procurement could
assist in bringing the public sector closer to a seamless
supply chain management. The introduction of electronic
procurement and the use of information technology in
public purchasing could process the logistics of public
sector purchasing faster and more efficiently. However, the
introduction of the competitive dialogue to facilitate the
award complex projects such as public private partnerships
and trans-European networks leaves many practical
questions over its nature and conduct unanswered. This
represents the biggest problem for the new regime.
The exceptional nature of the competitive dialogue and
its hierarchy with other award procedures (the wording of
the public sector Directive puts the procedure at a par with
the negotiated procedures with prior advertisement); the
discretion of contracting authorities to initiate the
procedure (who is to determine the nature of a particularly
complex contract and the inability of the contracting10
Amicus Curiae Issue 60 July/August 2005
11
Amicus Curiae Issue 60 July/August 2005
In
stitu
te
N
e
w
s
authorities to draw precise specifications and the contact’s
financial and legal make-up); the internal structure and
conduct of the procedure (the confusion surrounding the
different stages pre-tender and post tender); the response
of the private sector (the predictably very high costs in
participating); the degree of competition achieved (there is
great potential for post tender negotiations); and finally the
overall value for money results (in many instances the
completive dialogue is less flexible than the negotiated
procedures) are pertinent questions that have not been
addressed by the new public procurement regime.
Flexibility
Finally, under flexibility, we will see the relaxation of the
competitive tendering regime and the disengagement of
the public procurement rules in industries that operate
under competitive conditions, especially in the utilities
(telecoms and water sectors).
The objective of flexibility is the surprise element of the
new regulatory package. The relaxation of the competitive
tendering regime and the disengagement of the public
procurement rules in industries that operate under
competitive conditions in the utilities sectors indicate
future legal and regulatory blueprints.
However, a rather disappointing feature of the new
regime is the lack of clarity over the potential use of socio-
economic and environmental considerations as part of the
award criteria. Contrary to the European Court of Justice
case law where the promotion of employment of the
protection of the environment have been regarded as
legitimate award criteria for public contracts, the new
Directives do not confer the much needed flexibility in this
matter to contracting authorities.
Thursday 6 October, 6pm
Sponsored by Tottel Publishing Ltd
DAVID DI MAMBRO
Barrister, Lamb Chambers
Grounds of appeal
Thursday 20 October, 6pm
SARAH YOUNG
Legal and Research Unit,
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal
The new Asylum and Immigration Tribunal
Thursday 27 October, 6pm
ANN ABRAHAM
Parliamentary & Health Service Ombudsman
(Title to be confirmed)
Thursday 10 November at 6pm
SALS 2005 Annual Lecture
LORD JUSTICE THOMAS
Senior Presiding Judge, England & Wales
(Title to be confirmed)
Thursday 24 November
Afternoon seminar in association with Elsevier Publishing
Understanding identity cards
(Details to be confirmed)
Thursday 15 December at 6pm
ANNE OWERS
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for
England & Wales
(Title to be confirmed)
Thursday 12 January 2006
Afternoon seminar in association with Watson Burton,
solicitors, Newcastle upon Tyne
(Details to be confirmed)
Venue: Marriott Newcastle Hotel, Gosforth Park.
This is a draft programme, and the calendar of events will
be updated on the SALS website (http://ials.sas.ac.uk/
SALS/calendar.htm).
Booking is requested for all events, which will take place at
the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 17 Russell Square,
London WC1 unless otherwise stated. CPD accreditation
with the Law Society and the General Counsel of the Bar is
provided with most of our events. Those requiring CPD
accreditation must register on arrival.
Please contact Sue Rogers at the SALS office (tel: 020 7862
5865; email: sals@sas.ac.uk) for further information.
Christopher Bovis
Professor of Law and Jean Monnet Chair in European and Business Law,
Lancashire Law School; Visiting Senior Research Fellow, IALS, University
of London.
SALS Events
